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Abstract
Designing distributed protocols is complex and requires actions at very different levels: from
the design of an interaction flow supporting the desired application-specific guarantees, to the
selection of the most appropriate network-level protection mechanisms. To tame this complexity,
we propose AnBx , a formal protocol specification language based on the popular Alice & Bob
notation. AnBx offers channels as the main abstraction for communication, providing different
authenticity and/or confidentiality guarantees for message transmission. AnBx extends existing
proposals in the literature with a novel notion of forwarding channels, enforcing specific security
guarantees from the message originator to the final recipient along a number of intermediate
forwarding agents.
We give a formal semantics of AnBx in terms of a state transition system expressed in the
AVISPA Intermediate Format. We devise an ideal channel model and a possible cryptographic
implementation, and we show that, under mild restrictions, the two representations coincide,
thus making AnBx amenable to automated verification with different tools. We demonstrate the
benefits of the declarative specification style distinctive of AnBx by revisiting the design of two
existing e-payment protocols, iKP and SET.
Keywords: Protocol specification, protocol verification, model-checking, e-payment
1. Introduction
The Alice & Bob notation, also known as pro-
tocol narrations, is a popular device which has
been widely adopted in the literature as the
basis of several security protocol specification
frameworks [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. In such frameworks,
the semantics of the specification languages is
defined by a translation into lower level formats,
amenable to model-checking and automated ve-
rification. Besides making verification possible,
the translation semantics provides for a clean
separation between the abstract specification of
the protocol structure and the details of its im-
plementation, which may be generated directly
from the specification [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 6]. This
separation has a beneficial impact on both the
specification and the implementation: on the
Email addresses: bugliesi@unive.it (Michele
Bugliesi), calzavara@dais.unive.it (Stefano
Calzavara), samo@imm.dtu.dk (Sebastian Mo¨dersheim),
paolo.modesti@ncl.ac.uk (Paolo Modesti)
one hand, it helps focusing on application-level
properties, staying away from unnecessary low-
level details; on the other hand, it contributes
to strengthen the implementation and to ensure
the protocol end-to-end security, by delegating
to the compiler the selection of the most ade-
quate core implementation components.
Channel abstractions make a further step in
the same direction: they help designing dis-
tributed applications irrespective of the cryp-
tographic mechanisms needed to protect com-
munication, by interpreting channels as a secure
communication medium with built-in protection
against certain attacks (e.g., on confidentiality).
How these properties are actually ensured rep-
resents a different design aspect, which might
not be a concern of the application designer at
all, and may be left to the compiler.
Related work. Several papers in the literature
have taken this approach, and developed it along
different directions. First, there are papers that
propose the definition and implementation of
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different channel types, based on cryptographic
realizations and interaction patterns. Abadi et
al. propose a process calculus with native con-
structs for authentication and discuss a possible
cryptographic implementation [12]. Ada˜o and
Fournet design a variant of the pi-calculus with
secure communication and describe its compu-
tationally sound compilation into a concrete
implementation [13]. Other authors explore
the idea of compiling secure protocols for dis-
tributed sessions from convenient ML abstrac-
tions based on session types [14, 15].
Another line of research, instead, is more fo-
cused on reasoning about channels and their
ideal behaviour in an abstract way. Dilloway
and Lowe present a hierarchy of secure chan-
nels and discuss their relative strengths [16].
Bugliesi and Focardi devise secure channel ab-
stractions in a process algebraic setting and rea-
son about the relative power of a low-level ad-
versary [17]. Armando et al. model differ-
ent channel types using set-rewriting and lin-
ear temporal logic [18]. Kamil and Lowe adapt
the Strand Spaces model to deal with secure
channels, providing different security guaran-
tees [19, 20]. Mo¨dersheim and Vigano` consider
both an abstract characterization and a concrete
realization of channels, showing that both char-
acterizations coincide; the paper defines also the
notion of channels as goals and proves a related
compositionality result [21]. The same authors
also formalize some easy-to-check static condi-
tions that support a large class of channels and
applications and that are sufficient for vertical
security protocol composition [22]. These works
also demonstrated that Alice and Bob notation
is ideal for the combination with the channel no-
tation, and channel types were integrated both
in the languages AnB [4] and SPS [6]. In these
papers, the focus is on giving a very general
and concise semantics to Alice and Bob nota-
tion, namely defining with a few mathematically
simple principles the semantics in presence of an
arbitrary algebraic theory. With respect to this
semantics, [6] proves the correctness of a transla-
tor to formal models and implementations. Our
paper is based on this semantic machinery for
the cryptographic handling of messages, and de-
fines a rich set of channels on top of this basis.
Two more related works on channels we
should mention. Gibson-Robinson employs the
notion of channel (and their properties) for the
analysis of multi-layer security protocols [23].
Finally, Sprenger and Basin consider a refine-
ment approach where cryptographic protocols
are synthesised from high-level security goals;
one of the steps of the refinement process builds
on the usage of channel abstractions [24, 25].
Contributions. In the present paper we develop
channels one step further, generalizing them to
capture the notion of forwarding channel, an
abstraction that is not accounted for in exist-
ing protocol narration frameworks and is instead
critical for designing and reasoning about com-
plex protocols involving three or more parties.
A typical scenario for such protocols is repre-
sented by e-commerce transactions, in which a
customer requires a merchant to certify that her
payment has been cleared out, and the merchant
provides that evidence by forwarding to the cus-
tomer the notification she received from the
credit card issuer. Similarly, single sign-on pro-
tocols usually involve an authenticity-preserving
forwarding of access tokens from a trusted third-
party to different clients.
We develop the novel concept of forwarding
channel as part of AnBx , a formal specifica-
tion language that we introduce by conserva-
tively extending the semantics of the AnB lan-
guage [4]. AnBx includes modes for all kinds
of message forwarding, where all or some of the
properties of the original transmission are pre-
served upon relaying. In our characterization,
we provide both an abstract interpretation of
channels that captures their ideal behavior, and
a cryptographic implementation, and we prove
a formal correspondence between the two char-
acterizations. Both interpretations are based on
a translation to the AVISPA Intermediate For-
mat, hence AnBx is directly available for auto-
mated verification with the different tools that
adopt such format, such as OFMC [26].
We demonstrate the practical effectiveness of
our approach by an analysis and re-engineering
of two real-life e-payment protocols: iKP (Inter-
net Keyed Payment [27, 28]), and SET (Secure
Electronic Transaction [29, 30, 31]). Though
both protocols could be expressed in their full
complexity in AnBx , we rely on the abstract
channels available in the language to factor out
the cryptographic aspects almost entirely. The
resulting protocols are more concise, easier to
understand and, interestingly, more efficient to
verify than the original versions.
In addition, the AnBx formulations outper-
form the original specifications, in that they en-
joy stronger security goals and properties. As a
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byproduct of our comparative analysis, we also
find a (to the best of our knowledge) new flaw
in the original specification of iKP, and propose
an amended version that rectifies the problem.
Moreover, the Java implementation of the re-
vised versions of iKP and SET proved to be-
have well at run-time [11], in some cases execut-
ing even faster than their original counterparts.
This demonstrate that the benefits of using a
language like AnBx are not limited to the de-
sign and verification levels but they also impact
to the implementation and deployment phases.
Plan of the paper. Section 2 introduces the ba-
sics of AnBx . Section 3 focuses on the semantics
of the language and presents our formal results.
Sections 4-6 discuss our case studies. Section 7
concludes the presentation. The AnBx imple-
mentation, together with its analytical tool and
the scripts employed in the case studies, is avail-
able online1.
New contents. This paper integrates and ex-
tends the results reported in [32] and [4]. Sec-
tion 3 is novel: in previous work the semantics
of AnBx was defined by a direct translation to
AnB , based on a cryptographic implementation.
Here we recast our cryptographic implementa-
tion within the AVISPA Intermediate Format
IF, and provide an alternative IF characteriza-
tion, based on the ideal channel behaviour. We
then prove that the cryptographic implemen-
tation conforms with the ideal semantics. Be-
sides representing a valuable theoretical contri-
bution, the semantics correspondence has prac-
tical value, as it makes both characterizations
equally viable for automatic analysis within any
verification framework supporting IF. The SET
case study in Section 6 is new.
2. AnBx Protocol Specifications
AnBx is a formal protocol specification lan-
guage based on the popular (informal) Alice &
Bob notation. AnBx conservatively extends the
AnB specification language [4] with a richer no-
tion of communication channel.
2.1. Protocol Types and Agent Knowledge
Protocol narrations in AnBx are built around
an underlying signature of typed identifiers that
1http://www.dais.unive.it/~modesti/anbx/
Protocol : Diffie-Hellman
Types :
Agent A,B;
Number g,X,Y,Msg;
Knowledge :
A : A,B,g;
B : A,B,g;
Actions :
A→ B,(A |B |−) : exp(g,X)
B→ A,(B |A |−) : exp(g,Y)
A→ B,(−|−|−) : {|A,Msg|}exp(exp(g,Y),X)
Goals :
B authenticates A on Msg
Msg secret between A,B
Figure 1: Diffie-Hellman specification in AnBx
include protocol variables, constants, and func-
tion symbols. Variables are noted with upper-
case initials and represent values that are deter-
mined dynamically, at each protocol run. Con-
stants, in turn, are noted by lower-case identi-
fiers and represent values and functions that are
invariant across different protocol executions.
As an example, consider the AnBx specification
of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol in
Figure 1. Variables of type Agent are roles: here
we have the roles A and B, which get instantiated
to arbitrary concrete agents when executing the
protocol. The numbers g, X and Y , in turn, are
the (constant) group generator and the (vari-
able) random exponents of the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange.
an agent playing that role needs to execute
the protocol: this indirectly specifies what the
intruder will know when playing one of the roles
of the protocol. Only variables of type Agent
may be part of the initial knowledge. All other
variables represent values that are chosen ran-
domly by the participant who first uses them,
e.g., in the example A chooses X and B chooses
Y .
2.2. Protocol Actions
The core of an AnBx specification consists of
the message exchanges between the participants
in an ideal, unattacked run of the protocol. Ev-
ery action has either of the two forms below:
A→ B,η :M or A @→ B,η :M,
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noting standard and fresh exchanges, respec-
tively. In both cases, an agent playing role A
communicates message M to the agent playing
role B, along a communication channel that con-
veys the security guarantees specified by the ex-
change mode η . The AnBx modes are triples:
(Auth |Verifiers |Conf),
whose components may be set to an agent name
(a list of names for the Verifiers field), or un-
set, in which case they are filled with the dis-
tinguished symbol “−”. When the Conf field
is set, the action represents a confidential ex-
change, which guarantees that only the agent
named in the field has access to the message.
When the Auth field is set, the action identifies
an authentic exchange, which guarantees that
the message originates from the agent named in
the field; the Verifiers field must be set if and
only if the Auth field is set, to include a non-
empty list of agents that are entitled to verify
the authenticity of the message. Authentic ex-
changes may further specify that the message
being exchanged is freshly communicated by the
agent referenced in the Auth field: the notation
A @→ B,η : M serves that purpose. None of the
modes conveys any guarantee that the intended
recipients will eventually receive the message.
Though the intended purpose of the channel
modes is to hide low-level communication de-
tails, we remark that AnBx conservatively ex-
tends the AnB notation, making it possible to
freely intermix abstract exchanges and crypto-
graphic terms. Note, in particular, that the first
two actions in the Diffie-Hellman specification in
Figure 1 employ the channel modes to express
the authentic exchange of the two “half keys”,
while the third describes the exchange of mes-
sage Msg encrypted under the new key.
The idea to structure protocol specifications
around abstract mechanisms for secure commu-
nications is certainly not new, as we discussed
in Section 1. Among the various approaches in
the literature, the closest to ours is the “bul-
let” notation supported by AnB• [21], a spec-
ification language providing support for confi-
dential and authenticated channels. Every ex-
change mode available in AnB• can be easily
encoded in AnBx, as shown in Table 1 below;
however, AnBx provides additional expressive-
ness, as we discuss in the next section.
AnB• AnBx
Plain A→ B A→ B,(−|−|−)
Authentic A•→B A→ B,(A |B |−)
Confidential A→•B A→ B,(−|−|B)
Secure A•→•B A→ B,(A |B |B)
Table 1: Encoding of AnB• in AnBx
2.3. Forwarding Modes
In addition to the standard AnB• exchanges,
the AnBx modes allow additional generality.
Specifically, AnBx provides primitive support
for message forwarding, a feature which is not
made available by existing proposals, and that
instead constitutes a recurrent communication
pattern in practical applications. We will pro-
vide examples of concrete uses of forwarding in
our case studies; for the moment, we just illus-
trate the concept with some simple examples.
The first example shows how authenticity can
be preserved upon forwarding:
A→ B,(A |B,C |−) : M
B→C,(A |B,C |−) : M
The first action denotes an authentic exchange
that originates from A and is meant to be deliv-
ered to both B andC. Upon receiving M, agent B
forwards it to C in the second action, preserving
the authenticity guarantees by A. Notice that
the mode (A |B,C |−) in the second exchange
still mentions A as the source of the commu-
nication, even though the message is sent by B.
This pattern cannot be encoded in the AnB•
notation, since authentic messages are always
assumed to be originated by the agent specified
on the tail of the arrow.
Forwarding modes can be used also to imple-
ment a form of “blind” delivery, arising when an
agent relays messages that are intended to re-
main confidential for a third party:
A→ B,(−|−|C) : M
B→C,(−|−|C) : M
Here, A sends M to C confidentially, relying on B
to deliver the message. As in the previous case,
this protocol cannot be expressed in the AnB•
notation, in this case because secret messages
are always intended to be disclosed to the agent
specified on the head of the arrow.
Message forwarding is also available for fresh
exchanges, in various combinations. Assume
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message M is sent freshly from A to B:
A @→ B,(A |B,C |−) : M
Then both the following actions:
B → C,(A |B,C |−) :M
and:
B @→ C,(A |B,C |−) :M
are legal. With the first action, M is forwarded
to C without any freshness guarantee, whereas
the second action allowsC to verify the freshness
of the transmission.
2.4. Protocol Goals
AnBx protocol specifications are analyzed
and validated against a set of security goals, that
specify the properties expected of the protocol.
Like its predecessors, AnBx supports three stan-
dard kinds of goals, which we briefly review be-
low, referring the reader to [4] for full details.
• Weak Authentication goals have the form:
B weakly authenticates A on M,
and are defined in terms of non-injective
agreement on the runs of the protocol [33];
• Authentication goals have the form:
B authenticates A on M,
and are defined in terms of injective agree-
ment on the runs of the protocol, assessing
the freshness of the exchange;
• Secrecy goals have the form:
M secret between A1, . . . ,Ak,
and are intended to specify which agents
are entitled to learn message M at the end
of the protocol run.
3. AnBx Semantics
Following previous proposals [4, 21], we define
the semantics of AnBx in terms of a translation
to the AVISPA Intermediate Format IF [34].
IF is a set-rewriting calculus in which the se-
mantics of a protocol is described in terms of
a set of facts that encode the knowledge of the
honest agents and the intruder at the different
protocol steps, and a set of rewriting rules de-
scribing the state transitions of the participants
and the intruder during the protocol execution.
The rewriting rules for honest participants are
generated from the AnBx protocol specification,
while the capabilities available to the intruder
are modelled by protocol-independent rules, i.e.,
the intruder is not forced to follow the protocol
specification.
We define the translation from AnBx to IF in
several steps, conveniently exploiting the exist-
ing AnB2IF compiler [4] as a black box. Given
an AnBx specification, we translate it into a
corresponding AnB specification, in which the
AnBx modes are expressed as message tags (Sec-
tion 3.1). The resulting AnB specification is fed
to the AnB2IF compiler, which extracts from
the narration the actions associated with the
protocol agents, and renders them as IF rewrit-
ing rules (Section 3.2). The resulting IF rules
still include the tags from the annotated AnB
narration: a further transformation step (Sec-
tions 3.3 and 3.4) completes the translation, ex-
ploiting the tags to produce a cryptographic IF
specification and an ideal IF specification. We
refer to these two constructions as the Crypto-
graphic Channel Model (CCM) and the Ideal
Channel Model (ICM) respectively. The two
models are contrasted in Section 3.5.
3.1. From AnBx to AnB
The first step of the translation transforms
each action in the AnBx narration into a cor-
responding AnB action bearing additional an-
notations, which drive the later stages of the
translation.
The AnBx -to-AnB translation is conceptually
simple, though the presence of the fresh modes
and their interaction with the forward modes
hide a few subtleties. Our characterization of
freshness relies on a simple mechanism by which
the sender generates a fresh nonce and the recip-
ient caches every nonce it receives, telling fresh
messages from replicas by checking whether the
received nonce is in the cache. In case of for-
warding of a fresh message we reuse the same
nonce generated at the step which introduced
the message being forwarded.
In order to ensure that newly generated non-
ces are indeed fresh, the AnBx -to-AnB transla-
tion keeps track in a store ξ of all the protocol
variables introduced to represent the different
nonces created along the protocol steps. Note
that the store ξ does not have any counterpart
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in the translated protocols, and it is just an arti-
fact used in the translation to AnB , as described
below:
• At each fresh exchange which is not a for-
ward, we first select a nonce identifier N
that does not occur in ξ and then store in
ξ the 4-tuple (A,V˜ ,M,N) which includes the
name A of the source agent, a (non-empty)
list V˜ of intended verifiers, the message M
exchanged in the AnBx specification, and
the identifier N; the additional information
enables the reuse of the nonce N in all the
possible future forwards of message M.
• At each authentic forward action, we
lookup the store in search of a tuple whose
first three components match the Auth and
the Verifiers components of the mode, as
well as the message being forwarded; if such
a tuple exists, the action is a forward of a
fresh exchange, and we include the nonce
generated at that exchange among the com-
ponents of the forwarded message, irrespec-
tive of whether the forward is fresh or not
(this choice is technically convenient in the
definition of the translation). If the tuple
does not exist, then the source action must
be non-fresh, thus no nonce is included in
the forward of the generated message.
• When more than one entry in ξ matches
the required side-conditions, the most re-
cent match is used.
• The translation is undefined when a fresh
forward is performed, but no matching tu-
ple was found in the store.
In a practical implementation, one would of
course either use timestamps or sequence num-
bers, in order to limit the amount of data that
the receiver has to store. We remark, however,
that these realizations are isomorphic to our for-
mal model2.
A further subtlety in the translation arises
from blind forwards, i.e., when the recipient A
of a message M differs from the final intended
2A further possible alternative is to use challenge-
response protocols, but these generate additional net-
work traffic, which in turn would considerably com-
plicate our exposition of the two channel models and
their relationship, as well as the practical model-checking
problems induced in our tool.
receiver B, and the message M should not be ex-
posed to A. To capture the desired effect, we
wrap M inside the constructor blindB, to denote
that it should be readable only by B.
The translation clauses are listed in Table 2,
where we do not explicitly track the updating
of ξ for the sake of readability. The tags plain,
ctag, atag and stag are just as in [21]: in addi-
tion, we include the new tags fatag and fstag to
account for freshly authenticated channels. All
the tags are public constants in the target AnB
specification, while blindX is a public function
symbol for any X , so all this information is avail-
able to every agent (including the intruder). In
addition, the specification is extended with pri-
vate function symbols unblindX , parameterized
over the agents identity, which are used to ex-
tract the confidential messages3.
As a first, simple illustration, below we give
the annotated AnB narration that results from
applying the translation to the AnBx specifica-
tion of the protocol in Figure 1:
A→ B : atag,A,B,exp(g,X)
B→ A : atag,B,A,exp(g,Y )
A→ B : plain,{|Msg|}exp(exp(g,Y ),X)
As a further example, consider the following
variant of the blind forward protocol examined
earlier on:
A→ B,(−|−|C) : Msg, token
B→C,(−|−|C) : Msg, token
where we assume that the three agents use token
as a known tag marking their exchanges. The
resulting AnB narration is as follows:
A→ B : ctag,blindC(Msg, token)
B→C : ctag,blindC(Msg, token)
Error conditions. If none of the clauses in Ta-
ble 2 applies, the translation is undefined and
an error is reported. Errors signal unexecutable
specifications, which expect the protocol partici-
pants to send messages they are unable to com-
pose, since they lack some of the required in-
formation bits. One such error condition arises
when an agent is expected to execute a fresh
3In our implementation we actually rely on the
OFMC facility for asymmetric cryptography, since
the current implementation of AnB2IF does not sup-
port user-defined algebraic theories. Namely, we let
blindX (M), {M}b(X) where b(·) is a public function sym-
bol and inv(b(X)) is known only to X .
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JA→ B,(−|−|−) :MKξ = A→ B : plain,MJA→ B,(−|−| Bˆ) :MKξ = A→ B : ctag,blindBˆ(M)JA→ B,(Aˆ |V˜ |−) :MKξ = A→ B : atag, Aˆ,V˜ ,M,N if Aˆ 6= A and (Aˆ,V˜ ,M,N) ∈ ξ
= A→ B : atag, Aˆ,V˜ ,M otherwiseJA→ B,(Aˆ |V˜ | Bˆ) :MKξ = A→ B : stag,blindBˆ(Aˆ,V˜ ,M,N) if Aˆ 6= A and (Aˆ,V˜ ,M,N) ∈ ξ
= A→ B : stag,blindBˆ(Aˆ,V˜ ,M) otherwiseJA @→ B,(Aˆ |V˜ |−) :MKξ = A→ B : fatag, Aˆ,V˜ ,M,N if Aˆ = A (with N chosen fresh in ξ )
or Aˆ 6= A and (Aˆ,V˜ ,M,N) ∈ ξ
JA @→ B,(Aˆ |V˜ | Bˆ) :MKξ = A→ B : fstag,blindBˆ(Aˆ,V˜ ,M,N) if Aˆ = A (with N chosen fresh in ξ )
or Aˆ 6= A and (Aˆ,V˜ ,M,N) ∈ ξ
Table 2: Translation from AnBx to AnB
forward action for a message it received with-
out any freshness guarantee, as in the following
specification:
A→ B,(A |B,C |−) : M
B @→C,(A |B,C |−) : M
Further cases of unexecutable specifications
are identified by a subsequent translation step,
specifically during the AnB -to-IF translation.
Indeed, the blindX (M) construction for confiden-
tial messages has precisely the purpose to signal
to the AnB2IF compiler that message M can
only be seen by X , so that a protocol turns out to
be unexecutable if such a blinded message needs
to be read by another agent. Consequently, a
sequence of AnBx actions like the one below is
translated successfully to AnB , but the AnB2IF
compiler will reject it as non-executable, since
after the first exchange B has access to blindC(M)
and not to M:
A→ B,(−|−|C) : M
B→C,(−|−|−) : M
3.2. From AnB to IF
The AVISPA Intermediate Format IF [34] is a
low-level language for specifying transition sys-
tems using set rewriting. We refer the reader to
[4] for full details on the translation from AnB
to IF; here, we just provide an informal overview
to make the paper self-contained.
An IF specification P = (I,R,G) consists of an
initial state I, a set of transition rules R for the
protocol participants and the intruder, and a set
of goals G that determine which states count as
attack states. A protocol is safe when no attack
state is reachable from the initial state using the
transition rules.
An IF state is a set of ground facts, sepa-
rated by dots (“.”), which encode the know-
ledge of the different protocol agents. We di-
stinguish two kinds of facts: ik(m), which de-
notes that the intruder knows the term m, and
stateA (A,m1, . . . ,mn), which characterizes the lo-
cal state of an honest agent during the protocol
execution by the terms A, m1, . . . ,mn. The con-
stant A identifies the role of the agent, and,
by convention, the first message A is the name
of that agent4. Our formalization of the in-
truder also includes a further class of facts of
the form dishonest(A) to identify the dishonest
agents participating in the protocols. While
many tools assume that there is only a single
dishonest agent i (the “intruder”), our model
supports any number of collaborating dishonest
agents – one may still think of one intruder who
has compromised several agents and can now use
their identities.
We now discuss how the initial state is gen-
erated from an AnB specification. Let n de-
note a bounded number of protocol sessions and
let σ1, . . . ,σn be corresponding mappings from
the protocol roles R1, . . . ,Rm to concrete agent
names. Let K j stand for the initial knowledge of
4In contrast to the convention used in the AnBx
specification, IF makes a clear distinction between role
names, noted by calligraphic letters such as A , and vari-
ables of type Agent.
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the role R j, then the initial state is:
⋃
1≤i≤n,1≤ j≤m
{
{stateR j(K jσi)} if R jσi 6= i
{ik(K jσi),dishonest(i)} if R jσi = i
where i is a reserved constant denoting the iden-
tity of the intruder. The initial state thus con-
sists of the local states of the honest agents
and the initial knowledge of the intruder, which
is determined by the compromised agents; a
dishonest(i) fact is introduced when at least one
of the agents is compromised.
The transitions of an IF specification are of
the form L | Cond =[X ]⇒ R where L and R
are states, X is a set of fresh variables (rep-
resenting fresh values generated at run-time),
and Cond is a set of conditions, expressed as
(in)equalities and negated predicates. The se-
mantics of an IF rule is defined by the state
transitions it enables: from a state S the rule
enables a transition to a state S′ iff there exists
a substitution σ of the variables of L and X
such that Lσ ⊆ S, S′ = (S \Lσ)∪Rσ , and X σ
are fresh constants not occurring in S; moreover,
the conditions Condστ are true in S for every
substitution τ of the variables in Cond that do
not occur in L. We assume the ik(·) and the
dishonest(·) facts to be persistent, i.e., to be al-
ways propagated to the right-hand side of any
transition.
The semantics of AnB is just defined by the
translation from an AnB specification to IF.
The main point of the translation is to define
the behavior of the honest agents in terms of
IF transition rules, by identifying in particu-
lar what checks must be performed on the mes-
sages they receive, and how they construct the
messages they send out. The behavior of the
intruder, in contrast, is defined by protocol-
independent rules modelling a Dolev-Yao at-
tacker, such as:
ik(M).ik(K) ⇒ ik({M}K)
ik({M}K).ik(inv(K)) ⇒ ik(M)
The first rule describes both asymmetric encryp-
tion and signing, while the second one expresses
that the payload of a ciphertext can be retrieved
if the corresponding decryption key is known.
We use inv(·) as a private function symbol, em-
ployed, e.g., to represent the secret component
of a given key-pair. All the messages exchanged
by honest agents are always assumed to be medi-
ated by the intruder, i.e., every communication
happens through ik(·) facts.
We illustrate the translation from AnB to IF
with an example. Specifically, we give the IF
transitions for roles A and B from the AnB trans-
lation of the protocol in Figure 1. The IF tran-
sition rules are in Figure 2 below, where for the
sake of readability we do not explicitly repre-
sent the public tags in the state facts and we
turn the side-conditions of the transitions into
pattern matching:
stateA (A,B,g) =[X ]⇒
stateA (A,B,g,X).ik(atag,A,B,exp(g,X))
stateA (A,B,g,X).ik(atag,B,A,GY ) =[Msg]⇒
stateA (A,B,g,X ,GY,Msg).ik(plain,{|A,Msg|}exp(GY,X))
stateB(B,A,g).ik(atag,A,B,GX) =[Y ]⇒
stateB(B,A,g,GX ,Y ).ik(atag,B,A,exp(g,Y ))
stateB(B,A,g,GX ,Y ).ik(plain,{|A,Msg|}exp(GX ,Y ))
⇒ stateB(B,A,g,GX ,Y,Msg)
Figure 2: IF translation of the example of Figure 1
Notice in the second clause that A accepts any
value GY from the network, not necessarily the
result of a correct Diffie-Hellman exponentia-
tion, and applies it to encrypt the last message
of the protocol. Conversely, in the fourth clause,
B checks that the first encrypted message com-
ponent is indeed the identity of A, but it cannot
check anything about Msg, since it is freshly gen-
erated by another participant.
3.3. From IF to CCM
The Cryptographic Channel Model realizes
the AnBx channel modes by means of digital sig-
natures and public-key encryptions, represented
in a simple symbolic model of cryptography.
Honest agents. The translation of the honest
agents is based on the IF-to-CCM mapping de-
fined in Table 3. For rules generated by the
AnB2IF compiler, the corresponding CCM rule
results from applying the mapping in the ta-
ble. In the CCM code, we additionally asso-
ciate two key-pairs (pk(A), inv(pk(A))) for en-
cryption/decryption, and(sk(A), inv(sk(A))) for
verification/signature with every agent A acting
as the source of an authentic message or as the
target of a confidential exchange.
The message M occurring in all clauses in
Table 3 may be an arbitrary tuple. The last
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clause is the exception, as it only applies to vari-
ables: this clause handles the case of agents that
are expected to execute blind forward actions
for confidential or (fresh) secure messages. In
the AnB2IF translation, such agents receive the
messages to be forwarded as terms of the form
(t,X) for some variable X , as they are going to
accept any message at such steps, without in-
specting it: therefore, to obtain the correspond-
ing CCM code, we just remove the tag.
To illustrate, consider again the annotated
AnB blind-forward example we examined in
Section 3.1:
A → B : ctag,blindC(Msg, token)
B → C : ctag,blindC(Msg, token)
Though token is assumed to be known to all
agents, the forward action by B is performed
irrespectively of the actual content of the mes-
sage it receives, since B is not able to perform
any check on a confidential message for C. This
is shown by the IF code produced by the trans-
lation of the exchange to the CCM:
stateA (A,B,C, token) =[Msg]⇒
stateA (A,B,C, token,Msg).ik({Msg, token}pk(C))
stateB(B,C,A, token).ik(X)
⇒ stateB(B,C,A, token,X)
stateC (C,A,B, token).ik({Msg, token}pk(C))
⇒ stateC (C,A,B, token,Msg)
In the second transition rule, B accepts every
variable X provided by the intruder. (Recall
that the ik(X) fact is not reported explicitly on
the right-hand side of the arrow, since such facts
are persistent.) Conversely, in the third rule C
can verify that the second component of the en-
cryption is indeed the expected token available
in her knowledge.
An additional measure is needed for translat-
ing to the CCM the transitions expecting a fresh
message on input. These transitions are easily
identified in the annotated AnB code, as they
have an occurrence of fatag/fstag in their in-
coming message. For any such transition, let
B be the receiver, and N the nonce associated
with the fresh message. Now, to implement the
nonce-checking mechanism of replay protection
we discussed in Section 3.1, it is enough (i) to
predicate the transition to the side condition
not(seen(B,N)), and (ii) to introduce the fact
seen(B,N) to the right-hand side of the same
transition. For instance, for the sender of the
message A @→ B,(A |B |−) : Msg, the CCM will
comprise a transition of the form:
. . . =[N]⇒ ik({B,Msg,N}inv(pk(A))). . . .
with N fresh. Correspondingly, on the receiver
side, the transition in the CCM will be struc-
tured as follows:
. . . .ik({B,Msg,N}inv(pk(A))) | not(seen(B,N))
⇒ seen(B,N). . . .
As a result, message M is received only if the
nonce N was never seen before by the receiver:
if that is the case, and the message is accepted,
the receiver adds N to its cache of seen nonces.
Intruder rules. The symbols sk(·) and pk(·) in-
troduced earlier on are public functions. Con-
sequently, every agent, including the intruder,
can obtain the public keys of every other agent
as soon as their name is known: that gives the
intruder the full power of the Dolev-Yao model.
The function inv(·), providing the ability to con-
struct signing and decryption keys, is private,
and each agent A knows only her own private
keys inv(sk(A)) and inv(pk(A)). Notice that pri-
vate keys of dishonest agents are available to
the intruder, according to the definition of the
IF initial state in Section 3.2.
3.4. From IF to ICM
The Ideal Channel Model provides for a di-
rect representation of the communication modes
in terms of corresponding IF state facts that
encode the types of channel involved in the
exchanges. In particular, the ideal seman-
tics draws on the constructors athCh, cnfCh
and secCh, around which we define persistent
state facts that track the protocol exchanges.
Protocol-independent rewriting rules, in turn,
characterize the intended behaviour of the ideal
channels.
Honest agents. The translation of the honest
agents is based on the IF-to-ICM mapping de-
fined in Table 4. For each rule generated by the
AnB2IF compiler, the corresponding ICM rule
results from applying the mapping in the table.
Similarly to the CCM translation, the last case
in the table handles a blindly forwarding agent
who cannot check anything about the message
being forwarded.
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IF CCM
ik(plain,M) ik(M)
ik(ctag,blindB(M)) ik({M}pk(B))
ik(atag,A,V˜ ,M) ik({V˜ ,M}inv(sk(A)))
ik(stag,blindB(A,V˜ ,M)) ik({{V˜ ,M}inv(sk(A))}pk(B))
ik(fatag,A,V˜ ,M,N) ik({V˜ ,M,N}inv(sk(A)))
ik(fstag,blindB(A,V˜ ,M,N)) ik({{V˜ ,M,N}inv(sk(A))}pk(B))
ik(t,X) t ∈ {ctag,stag, fstag} ik(X)
Table 3: Translation from IF to CCM
IF chanIF
ik(plain,M) ik(M)
ik(ctag,blindB(M)) cnfCh(B;M)
ik(atag,A,V˜ ,M) athCh(A;V˜ ;M)
ik(stag,blindB(A,V˜ ,M)) secCh(A;V˜ ;B;M)
ik(fatag,A,V˜ ,M,N) athCh(A;V˜ ;M,N)
ik(fstag,blindB(A,V˜ ,M,N)) secCh(A;V˜ ;B;M,N)
ik(t,X) t ∈ {ctag,stag, fstag} ik(X)
Table 4: Translation from IF to ICM
For our blind forwarding example, the trans-
lation to the ICM generates the following IF
transition rules:
stateA (A,B,C, token) =[Msg]⇒
stateA (A,B,C, token,Msg).cnfCh(C;Msg, token)
stateB(B,C,A, token).ik(X)
⇒ stateB(B,C,A, token,X)
stateC (C,A,B, token).cnfCh(C;Msg, token)
⇒ stateC (C,A,B, token,Msg)
The only significant difference with respect to
the CCM is that the encrypted message for C is
replaced by a cnfCh(C; ·) channel fact.
Two comments are in order for the ICM trans-
lation. First, nonces are implicitly included in
the payload of the message when freshness is lost
upon forwarding: this choice reflects the corre-
sponding behavior in the CCM, where nonces
cannot be removed from digitally signed pack-
ets. Second, given that the state channel facts
employed in the ICM are persistent, we need
additional measures to protect against replicas
in all transitions expecting a fresh message on
input. For that purpose, we rely on the very
same mechanism described earlier for the cryp-
tographic model, based on the seen(·, ·) facts to
tell replicas apart. Even though we could define
additional non-persistent channel facts to model
fresh channels, this choice simplifies the defi-
nition of the correspondence between the two
channel models and the related proof.
Intruder rules. The intruder rules constitute
the key component of the ideal semantics, as it
is through these rules that we define the actual
interpretation of our channel facts. The rules
are reported in Table 5 below.
ik(V˜ ).ik(M).dishonest(A)⇒ athCh(A;V˜ ;M)
athCh(A;V˜ ;M)⇒ ik(M).ik(V˜ )
ik(B).ik(M)⇒ cnfCh(B;M)
cnfCh(B;M).dishonest(B)⇒ ik(M)
athCh(A;V˜ ;M).ik(B)⇒ secCh(A;V˜ ;B;M)
secCh(A;V˜ ;B;M).dishonest(B)⇒ athCh(A;V˜ ;M)
Table 5: Intruder rules for ICM
An intruder can forge a message over an au-
thentic channel only if the associated sender
identity is compromised, while he can learn ev-
ery message sent over an authentic channel. Du-
ally, an intruder can send over a confidential
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channel every message he can compose, but he
can learn a message sent over a confidential
channel only if the associated receiver identity
is compromised.
In addition, we give the intruder two more
abilities for secure channels, corresponding to
those available in the CCM. Specifically, the last
two transitions in Table 5 provide the intruder
with the ability to secure authentic channel,
and to drop confidentiality from secure channels
shared with compromised agents. The two tran-
sitions reflect the corresponding intruder capa-
bilities available in the CCM, where an intruder
can upgrade a message on a (fresh) authentic
channel to one on a (fresh) secure channel, by
encrypting it, and dually access the contents of
a secure message directed to a compromised re-
ceiver, by decrypting it.
3.5. Relating ICM and CCM
We complete our formalization of the AnBx
semantics by analyzing the relationship between
the ICM and the CCM characterizations. As a
first step, we define a correspondence relation
∼ between ICM and CCM states, that relates
states that only differ in their encoding of chan-
nels. Intuitively, two ∼-correspondent states en-
code the same local knowledge for each protocol
agent and the intruder.
The formal definition of ∼ is given below: it
relies on the simple mapping from ICM states
to CCM states shown in Table 6.
ICM CCM
ik(M) ik(M)
cnfCh(B;M) ik({M}pk(B))
athCh(A;V˜ ;M) ik({V˜ ,M}inv(sk(A)))
secCh(A;V˜ ;B;M) ik({{V˜ ,M}inv(sk(A))}pk(B))
Table 6: Mapping the ICM to the CCM
Definition 1 (Corresponding States). Let
S1 be an ICM state and S2 be a CCM state. We
say that S1 and S2 are corresponding states
(noted S1 ∼ S2) if and only if:
• S1 and S2 contain the same facts besides
channel facts and intruder knowledge facts,
• the intruder knowledge in S1 and S2 is the
same when removing all messages that con-
tain CCM material; and
• the channel facts in S1 and intruder knowl-
edge of crypto-encodings in S2 are equiva-
lent modulo the mapping in Table 6.
2
Based on this definition, we now turn to the
problem of establishing a semantic equivalence
between the ICM and the CCM, proving a one-
to-one correspondence between attack states.
Given an AnBx specification P, let CCM(P) and
ICM(P) stand for its translation to the CCM and
to the ICM, respectively.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Let P be an AnBx
specification. For each state S1 reachable from
ICM(P) there exists a state S2 reachable from
CCM(P) such that S1 ∼ S2.
Proof 1. We proceed by induction on the num-
ber of steps performed. The initial states are
equivalent modulo ∼ by definition of our trans-
lation. Let us assume, by induction hypothesis,
that S1 ∼ S2 for some reachable ICM state S1
and some reachable CCM state S2. Let S′1 be
an ICM state reachable from S1 in one step: we
show that there exists a CCM state S′2 such that
S′2 is reachable from S2 in one step and S
′
1 ∼ S′2.
We proceed by a case analysis on the transi-
tion rule r applied to rewrite S1 into S′1. The
easiest case is when r is an intruder rule, which
does not involve any channel fact (e.g., a rule
like ik(M).ik(K)⇒ ik({M}K)). In this case the
very same rule can be applied also in the CCM to
obtain an equivalent state. A similar reasoning
applies for honest agents rules, given the defi-
nition of our translation. The most interesting
possibility is when r is an intruder rule involving
channel facts.
We show the cases for authentic channels as
representative of all other cases:
• Let r = ik(V˜ ).ik(M).dishonest(A) ⇒
athCh(A;V˜ ;M). Since S1 ∼ S2, the in-
truder knows M also in S2. The CCM
encoding of the channel fact on the right
side of the rule is ik({V˜ ,M}inv(sk(A))). This
term can be constructed by the intruder
in the CCM, since dishonest(A) implies
that inv(sk(A)) is known to the intruder.
Therefore, there is a reachable state S′2
such that S′1 ∼ S′2.
• Let r = athCh(A;V˜ ;M)⇒ ik(M).ik(V˜ ). Since
S1 ∼ S2, the intruder knows in S2 the CCM
encoding of the channel fact, i.e., we have
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ik({V˜ ,M}inv(sk(A))) ∈ S2. The intruder can
thus learn M and V˜ by verification of the
signature, using sk(A). Therefore, an S′2
with S′1 ∼ S′2 is reachable.
The proof for confidential and secure channels
proceeds along the same lines, identifying a 1:1
correspondence between a transition in the ICM
and a transition in the CCM. 2
Theorem 1 shows that the CCM is a sound
implementation of the ICM: if we verify a pro-
tocol in the CCM, then the protocol is also se-
cure in the ICM. The opposite direction, which
we call completeness, does not hold in general,
since there is an unbounded number of reachable
CCM states which do not have any counterpart
in the ICM. Still, for verification purposes, we
are interested in attack states, and we can in
fact prove a formal result about them. Carrying
out such proof is challenging, since in principle
the intruder can abuse channel encodings inside
CCM states for mounting attacks which would
not work in the ICM, where such cryptographic
messages are not present at all.
The insight is interpreting such abuses as a
special case of “type-flaw” attacks, as the in-
truder is actually fooling the honest agents in
improperly using cryptographic material related
to the channel encodings. Interestingly, it is
well-known that type-flaw attacks can be sys-
tematically prevented by good protocol design,
when all message components are annotated
with sufficient information to enforce a unique
interpretation [35, 36]. These “typing results”
do not keep the intruder from sending ill-typed
messages (e.g., sending an encrypted message
in place of a nonce); rather, they ensure that
every message (part) has a unique interpreta-
tion. Then, it can be shown that if an attack
exists, also a well-typed attack exists – hence
it never helps the intruder to use ill-typed mes-
sages. Considering only well-typed attacks is a
convenient proof strategy for our completeness
result and it bears no loss of generality for the
class of typeable protocols.
Typeable protocols. We presuppose a finite set
of basic type symbols B (like nonce, agent, etc.).
We define the set T of composed types as the
least set that contains B and that is closed un-
der the following property: if τ1, . . . ,τn ∈ T and
f is a function symbol of arity n, then also
f (τ1, . . . ,τn) ∈ T .
We note with Γ typing environments, binding
constants and variables of a protocol specifica-
tion to types, so that Γ(c)∈ B for every constant
c and Γ(X) ∈ T for every variable X . We extend
Γ to a function on arbitrary terms as follows:
Γ( f (t1, . . . , tn)) = f (Γ(t1), . . . ,Γ(tn)) .
Definition 2 (Typeable Protocol).
Consider a CCM protocol specification P
with the standard operators for symmetric and
asymmetric encryption, and such that commu-
nication occurs only via ik(·) facts (i.e., the
transition rules of the protocol agents operate
on disjoint facts for disjoint agents).
Let the set MP(P) of message patterns of P
be defined as the set of all terms of the form
ik(m) in the initial state and the transition rules
of the honest agents; we assume here that vari-
ables occurring in MP(P) are α-renamed in such
a way that no two distinct elements have a com-
mon variable (α renaming is assumed to be type
consistent). Let then finally:
SMP(P) = {s | sv t ∈MP(P)∧ s /∈ V }
∪ {inv(k) | {m}k v t ∈MP(P)},
be the the non-variable subterms of message pat-
terns as well as all decryption keys, again un-
der α-renaming (v denotes the subterm rela-
tionship.)
We say that the protocol P is typeable in a
typing environment Γ if for all s, t ∈ SMP(P) one
has Γ(s) = Γ(t) iff s and t have a unifier. We
omit Γ when clear from the context. 2
Theorem 2 (Well-typed Attacks). If there
is an attack against a typeable protocol, then
there is a well-typed one, i.e., where every vari-
able X is instantiated with a term t such that
Γ(X) = Γ(t).
Proof 2. A simple adaptation of the proof
in [37]. See Appendix Appendix A for details.
2
As usual, the notion of typing we adopt rules
out as non-typeable many specifications that are
actually perfectly alright. This happens when
several messages have similar formats. In this
case, we cannot apply the theorem on well-typed
attacks (and invoke the completeness theorem
below). Fortunately, there is a systematic way
to make all protocols typeable, by adding tags
to tell different messages apart, a practice which
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is not expensive in the implementation and does
not destroy any standard authentication and se-
crecy property.
We are finally ready to state and prove the
completeness result for our typed model. We
conjecture that such result may hold true also
for arbitrary attacks on any given protocol, but
we do not see any viable proof strategy for this
more general setting.
Theorem 3 (Completeness). Let P be an
AnBx specification and let us assume a well-
typed attack in CCM(P) that leads to the attack
state S2. Then there exists a reachable attack
state S1 in ICM(P) such that S1 ∼ S2.
Proof 3. First observe that an honest agent
can only receive messages that are a well-typed
instance of a message in MP(P) for the CCM
variant of P. Thus, there is no point for the
intruder to construct any such messages unless
they can be used for decryption, in which case
they are also subterms of a well-typed instance
in MP(P) or inv(·) thereof.
Further, observe that the key functions sk(·)
and pk(·) also are typed, and may occur only in
the channel encodings in the CCM and not in
the AnBx protocol specification. Hence, the in-
truder can use the channel keys for composition
of messages only as it is intended by the proto-
col, e.g., we can exclude double encryption with
the channel key pk(·).
Now, we prove a stronger statement, namely
that any well-typed attack trace in CCM(P) has
a corresponding attack trace in ICM(P) with the
same length such that every state in the first
trace corresponds (in the sense defined by ∼) to
its matching state in the second trace. We pro-
ceed by induction on the length of the trace. If
the trace is empty, then the conclusion is im-
mediate by definition of our translation. Oth-
erwise, assume the attack trace in CCM(P) in-
cludes a transition from a state S2 to a state S′2.
By inductive hypothesis, there exists a reachable
state S1 in ICM(P) such that S1 ∼ S2. We show
that there exists an ICM state S′1 such that S
′
1 is
reachable from S1 in one step and S′1 ∼ S′2.
As the most interesting case, consider an
asymmetric encryption step of the intruder, en-
crypting a message M with public key K. We
thus have {ik(M), ik(K)} ⊆ S2, while ik({M}K) ∈
S′2. By the typing assumption, we have either of
the following cases:
• Neither M nor K contain pk(·) or sk(·) as
subterms, i.e., they are not related to chan-
nel material. Then by definition of ∼ we
have that {ik(M), ik(K)} ⊆ S1 and so the
same step is possible in the ICM.
• K = pk(B) and M does not contain pk(·)
or sk(·). Then by definition of ∼ we have
ik(M) ∈ S1. The result here corresponds to
proving cnfCh(B;M)∈ S′1, which can be gen-
erated by the rule ik(B).ik(M)⇒ cnfCh(B;M)
in the ICM.
• K = pk(B) and M = {V˜ ,M0}inv(sk(A)), i.e.
the intruder turns an authentic message
from A for verifiers V˜ into a secure mes-
sage for B. Since ik(M) ∈ S2, by def-
inition of ∼ we have athCh(A;V˜ ;M0) ∈
S1, and thus we can reach the corre-
sponding secCh(A;V˜ ;B;M0) ∈ S′1 by the rule
athCh(A;V˜ ;M).ik(B)⇒ secCh(A;V˜ ;B;M) in
the ICM.
All other encryptions steps would produce mes-
sages that cannot be received and we excluded
these redundant steps above.
The cases for signing, analysis, and the tran-
sitions of honest agents similarly have a 1:1 cor-
respondence in the ICM. 2
Theorems 2 and 3 can be combined as fol-
lows. Given a protocol P, we verify that its CCM
translation satisfies the assumptions of the typ-
ing result: note that the conditions to check are
purely syntactical and can be effectively mech-
anized. We then know that, if P has an attack,
then it has a well-typed one, so our complete-
ness result shows that there is also an attack on
the ICM. Thus, if ICM(P) is secure, then so is
CCM(P).
Conceptually, the ICM is the preferential defi-
nition of our channels, as it is independent of the
specific implementation details and it focuses
solely on formalizing the behaviour of chan-
nels, and as such is amenable for protocol de-
sign. Moreover, for tools like ProVerif [38] and
SATMC [39], the ideal model is easier for ver-
ification, since it is free of most of the typing
problems such as those discussed above. On
the other hand, the CCM is more convenient in
conjunction with other model-checking tools like
the ones of AVISPA [26], where CCM specifica-
tions may be verified directly. Collectively, our
results have thus relevant practical consequences
for automating security verification, with several
different tools.
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4. Case Study: e-Payment Protocols
We demonstrate AnBx at work on the speci-
fication of a wide and interesting class of proto-
cols, namely e-payment protocols, showing how
it naturally accounts for all the necessary primi-
tives to provide, and reason about, the required
high-level security guarantees.
4.1. Introducing the Case Studies
The first case study we propose is the iKP
e-payment protocols family, showing how AnBx
lends itself to a robust and modular design that
captures the increasing level of security enforced
by the different protocols in the iKP family, de-
pending on the number of principals possess-
ing a certified signing key. Interestingly, as a
byproduct of our design and verification efforts,
we isolate a new flaw in the original iKP speci-
fication and propose a fix.
The second case study illustrates a revised
version of SET, a protocol that for its complex-
ity is considered a benchmark for protocol anal-
ysis. Here, we shift our attention to some known
security flaws of the protocol and show that
our AnBx variant is immune to such defects.
Notably, the case study employs fresh forward
modes to propose a simple solution to a known
issue related to payment authorization [40].
In both case studies, our revised version of
the protocols outperforms the original one in
terms of security guarantees. This was largely
expected, since the AnBx channel abstractions
convey protection on all message components;
however, we believe that our exercise of revisit-
ing existing protocols provides evidence about
the value of employing adequate channel ab-
stractions for protocol design. In fact, our re-
vised protocols have a much simpler structure
than their original specification and, in prin-
ciple, a robust implementation can be auto-
matically synthesised from their AnBx narra-
tion, yielding stronger and more scalable secu-
rity guarantees with limited effort.
We postpone a detailed discussion on the ver-
ification setup until Section 4.4, and turn now
to the details of the e-payment protocols speci-
fication in AnBx.
4.2. A Basic e-Payment Scheme
We outline the bare-bone specification of an e-
payment protocol, exposing the protocol struc-
ture and the message formats common to both
our case studies.
We presuppose three principals: a Customer
C, a Merchant M and an Acquirer A, i.e., a finan-
cial institution entitled to process a payment. In
our model, each principal starts with an initial
knowledge shared with other participants. In-
deed, since most e-payment protocols describe
only the payment transaction and do not con-
sider any preliminary phase, we assume that the
Customer and the Merchant have already agreed
on the details of the transaction, including an
order description (desc) and a price. We also
assume that the Acquirer shares with the Cus-
tomer a customer’s account number (can) com-
prising a credit card number and the related
PIN. The initial knowledge of the three parties
can thus be summarized as follows: C knows
price, desc, can; M knows price, desc; and A
knows can.
The transaction can be decomposed into the
following steps:
1. C→M : Initiate
2. C←M : Invoice
(In steps 1 and 2 the Customer and
the Merchant exchange all the information
which is necessary to compose the next pay-
ment messages.)
3. C→M : Payment Request
4. M→ A : Authorization Request
(In steps 3 and 4 the Customer sends a pay-
ment request to the Merchant. The Mer-
chant uses this information to compose an
authorization request for the Acquirer and
tries to collect the payment.)
5. M← A : Authorization Response
6. C←M : Confirm
(In steps 5 and 6 the Acquirer processes
the transaction information, and then re-
lays the purchase data directly to the is-
suing bank, which then authorizes the sale
in accordance with the Customer’s account.
This interaction is not part of the narra-
tion. The Acquirer returns a response to
the Merchant, indicating success or failure
of the transaction. The Merchant then in-
forms the Customer about the outcome.)
Interestingly, steps (4) and (6) involve forward-
ing operations, since the Customer never com-
municates directly with the Acquirer, but some
credit-card information from the Customer must
flow to the Acquirer through the Merchant to
compose a reasonable payment request, while
the final response from the Acquirer must flow
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to the Customer through the Merchant to pro-
vide evidence of the transaction.
In addition to some elements of the ini-
tial knowledge, other information needs to be
exchanged in the previous protocol template.
First, to make transactions univocally identifi-
able, the Merchant generates a fresh transac-
tion ID (tid) for each different transaction. Sec-
ond, the Merchant associates to the transaction
also a date or any appropriate timestamp. Both
pieces of information must be communicated to
the other parties. The transaction is then iden-
tified by a contract, which comprises most of
the previous information. If Customer and Mer-
chant reach an agreement on it, and they can
prove this to the Acquirer, then the transaction
can be completed successfully. The details on
the structure of the contract vary among differ-
ent protocols. At the end of the transaction,
the authorization auth is then returned by the
Acquirer, and communicated to the two other
participants.
Message formats. Our protocol templates pre-
suppose the exchange of three kinds of messages:
either simple names, m, or tuples of messages
(M˜), or else message digests.
We represent digest creation simply as a term
[M] by which an agent may prove the knowledge
of a message M without leaking it to the recip-
ient: this is implemented in OFMC through a
non-invertible function symbol. We also con-
sider digests which are resistant to dictionary
attacks, hence presupposing an implementation
based on a hashing scheme that combines the
message M with a shared key known only to the
principal which must verify the digest. We note
with [M:A] a digest of a message M which is in-
tended to be verified only by A. The symbolic
implementation of this HMAC primitive is stan-
dard, and full details can be found in the scripts
employed for our case studies.
4.3. Protocol Goals
We provide a brief overview of our security
properties of interest for e-payment protocols.
Further details about the validated protocol
goals are later reported for each case study.
A first goal we would like to meet for an e-
payment system is that all the principals agree
on the contract they sign. In terms of OFMC
goals, this corresponds to requiring that each
participant can authenticate the other two par-
ties on the contract. Moreover, the Acquirer
should be able to prove to the other two par-
ties that the payment has indeed been autho-
rized and the associated transaction performed:
in OFMC this can be represented by requiring
that M and C can authenticate A on the autho-
rization auth.
A stronger variant of the goals described
above requires that, after completion of a trans-
action, each participant is able to provide a non-
repudiable proof of the effective agreement by
the other two parties on the terms of the trans-
action. In principle, each principal may wish
to have sufficient proofs to convince an external
verifier that the transaction was actually car-
ried out as she claims. The lack of some of
these provable authorizations does not neces-
sarily make the protocol insecure, but it makes
disputes between the parties difficult to settle,
requiring to rely on evidence provided by other
parties or to collect off-line information.
Finally, we are also interested in some secrecy
goals, like verifying that the Customer’s credit
card information can is kept confidential, and
transmitted only to the Acquirer. In general,
we would like to keep the data exchanged by the
principals secret among the parties who strictly
need to access them for protocol functionality.
4.4. Experimental Setup
We verified the AnBx specifications of iKP
and SET by compiling them into their cryp-
tographic implementation, using our tool, and
running OFMC on the generated CCM trans-
lation against the described security goals. We
also encoded and verified the original versions
of iKP and SET, and compared the results with
those of the revised versions. In the following
we report on the results of such tests.
For all the tests we ran OFMC in classic mode
with one and two symbolic sessions, using both
the typed and the untyped mode: with two ses-
sions we were sometimes unable to complete the
verification due to search space explosion. We
ran intensive tests with a fixed number of ses-
sions. This bounds how many protocol execu-
tions the honest agents can engage in, while the
intruder is left unbounded thanks to the sym-
bolic lazy intruder technique in OFMC. In the
following we say that a goal is met only if it is
satisfied in all the considered settings.
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mode/step → 1KP 2KP 3KP
η1 C→M (−|−|−) (−|−|M) @(C |M |M)
η2 C←M (−|−|−) @(M |C |−) @(M |C |C)
η3 C→M (−|−|A) (−|−|A) (C |A |A)
η4a M→ A (−|−|A) (−|−|A) (C |A |A)
η4b M→ A (−|−|A) @(M |A |A) @(M |A |A)
η5 M← A @(A |C,M |−) @(A |C,M |M) @(A |C,M |M)
η6 C←M (A |C,M |−) (A |C,M |−) (A |C,M |C)
certified
agents
A M,A C,M,A
Table 7: Exchange modes for the revised iKP e-payment protocol
5. The iKP Protocol Family
The iKP protocol family was developed at
IBM Research [27, 28, 41] to support credit
card-based transactions between customers and
merchants (under the assumption that payment
clearing and authorization may be handled se-
curely off-line). All protocols in the family are
based on public-key cryptography. The idea is
that, depending on the number of parties that
own certified public key-pairs, we can achieve
increasing levels of security, as reflected by the
name of the different protocols (1KP, 2KP, and
3KP).
5.1. Protocol Narration
Despite the complexity of iKP, by abstract-
ing from cryptographic details, we can isolate a
common communication pattern underlying all
the protocols of the family. Namely, a common
template can be specified as follows:
1. C→M,η1 : [can:A], [desc:M]
2. C←M,η2 : price, tid,date, [contract]
3. C→M,η3 : price, tid,can, [can:A], [contract]
4. M→ A (decomposed in two steps to specify
different communication modes)
(a) M→ A,η4a :
price, tid,can, [can:A], [contract]
(b) M→ A,η4b :
price, tid,date, [desc:M], [contract]
5. M← A,η5 : auth, tid, [contract]
6. C←M,η6 : auth, tid, [contract]
with contract ,
(price, tid,date, [can:A], [desc:M]).
By instantiating the exchange modes η j in the
previous scheme, one may generate the AnBx
variants of the different protocols in the iKP
family, achieving different security guarantees:
this is exactly what we do in Table 7. Notice
that all the considered protocols rely on blind
forwarding at step 4 to communicate sensitive
payment information from the Customer to the
Acquirer, without disclosing them to the Mer-
chant. Moreover, a forwarding operation is em-
ployed at step 6 to preserve the authenticity of
the response by the Acquirer.
5.2. Main Results of iKP Security Verification
We verified the AnBx protocols described
above and carried out a corresponding analy-
sis of the original specifications of {1,2,3}KP, as
amended in [42]. Below we refer to this amended
version as the “original” iKP, to be contrasted
with the “revised” AnBx version in Table 7. In
both cases, we ran our tests assuming that the
Acquirer is trusted, i.e., encoded as a concrete
agent a rather than as a role A; this is often
a reasonable assumption in e-payment applica-
tions. As we mentioned earlier, the AnBx speci-
fications are not just more scalable and remark-
ably simpler, but they also provide stronger se-
curity guarantees, which are detailed in Table 8
and commented further below.
During the analysis of the original 2KP and
3KP we found a (to the best of our knowledge)
new flaw. It is related to the authenticity of
the Authorization response auth that is gener-
ated by the Acquirer and then sent to the other
principals at steps 5 and 6. In particular, the
starred goals in Table 8 are met only after chang-
ing the protocol by adding the identities of Mer-
chant and Customer inside the signature of the
Acquirer in the original specification. In 2KP,
since the Customer is not certified, this can be
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1KP 2KP 3KP
Goal O R O R O R
can secret between C,A + + + + + +
A weakly authenticates C on can - - - - + +
desc secret between C,M + + + + + +
auth secret between C,M,A - - - - - +
price secret between C,M,A - - - - - -
M authenticates A on auth +* + +* + +* +
C authenticates A on auth + + + + + +
A authenticates C on [contract ] - - - - w w
M authenticates C on [contract ] - - - - + +
A authenticates M on [contract ] - - + + w +
C authenticates M on [contract ] - - + + + +
C authenticates A on [contract ],auth + + + + + +
M authenticates A on [contract ],auth +* + +* + +* +
* goal satisfied only fixing the definition of SigA [28]
w = only weak authentication
Table 8: Security goals satisfied by Original and Revised iKP
done with an ephemeral identity derived from
the credit card number.
It is worth noting that, after the completion
of the revised and the amended original 3KP,
each party has evidence of transaction autho-
rization by the other two parties, since the pro-
tocol achieves all the authentication goals that
can ideally be requested, according to the num-
ber of certified principals. Moreover, our revised
3KP, with respect to the original version, pro-
vides the additional guarantee of preserving the
secrecy of the authorization response Auth.
In contrast, the original 3KP protocol, the
strongest proposed version, fails in two authen-
tication goal: A can only weakly authenticate M
and C on [contract]. Luckily, if the transaction
ID tid is unique, this is only a minor problem,
since [contract] should also be unique, i.e., two
different contracts cannot be confused.
6. SET Purchase Protocol
Secure Electronic Transaction (SET ) is a
family of protocols for securing credit card
transactions over insecure networks. This stan-
dard was proposed by a consortium of credit
card companies and software corporations led
by Visa and MasterCard and involving compa-
nies like IBM, Microsoft, Netscape, RSA and
Verisign.
In the present paper we consider the SET pur-
chase protocol as outlined in [31]. In the follow-
ing we distinguish a signed and an unsigned ver-
sion of SET : in the former all the parties possess
certified key-pairs, while in the latter the Cus-
tomer does not.
6.1. Protocol Narration
Given the complexity of SET, to ease the com-
parison with other works on such protocol, in
this presentation the information exchanged by
the principals is denoted with the names com-
monly used in SET specifications. We introduce
some basic concepts of the protocol by simply
providing a mapping of the exchanged data to
the corresponding information in the bare-bone
specification presented in Section 4: this should
clarify the role of most of the elements. We can
identify PurchAmt with price, OrderDesc with
desc and pan with can. The initial knowledge of
the three parties can then be summarized as fol-
lows: C knows PurchAmt, OrderDesc and pan;
M knows PurchAmt and OrderDesc; A knows
pan.
During the protocol run, the principals gen-
erate some identifiers: LIDM is a local trans-
action identifier that the Customer sends to
the Merchant, while the Merchant generates
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mode/step → unsigned SET signed SET
η1 C→M (−|−|M) @(C |M |M)
η2 C←M @(M |C |−) @(M |C |C)
η3a C→M (−|−|M) @(C |M |M)
η3b C→M (−|−|A) (C |A |A)
η4a M→ A (−|−|A) (C |A |A)
η4b M→ A @(M |A |A) @(M |A |A)
η5 M← A @(A |C,M |M) @(A |C,M |M)
η6 C←M @(A |C,M |−) @(A |C,M |C)
certified
agents
M,A C,M,A
Table 9: Exchange modes for the revised SET e-payment protocol
another session identifier XID ; we denote the
pair (LIDM,XID) with TID. Finally, we com-
plete our abstraction by stipulating OIdata =
OrderDesc and PIdata = pan; we let HOD =
([OIdata:M], [PIdata:A]). The latter contains
the evidence (digest) of the credit card that the
Customer intends to use, and the evidence of the
order description that will later be forwarded to
the Acquirer. In our model HOD plays the role
of the dual signature, a cryptographic mecha-
nism central to SET, which is employed to let
the Merchant and the Acquirer agree on the
transaction without giving any of them full view
of the details. Namely, as we said, the Merchant
does not need the customer’s credit card number
to process an order, but he only needs to know
that the payment has been approved by the Ac-
quirer. Conversely, the Acquirer does not need
to be aware of the details of the order, but he
just needs evidence that a particular payment
must be processed.
Although many papers on SET [31, 43, 40]
focus their attention on the signed version of
the protocol, again we note that both versions
expose a common pattern which allows for an
easy specification in AnBx. The narration de-
picting the common structure of the protocols
is reported below:
1. C→M,η1 : LIDM
2. M→C,η2 : XID
3. C→M (decomposed in two steps to specify
different communication modes)
(a) C→M,η3a : TID,HOD
(b) C→M,η3b :
TID,PurchAmt,HOD,PIdata
4. M→ A (decomposed in two steps to specify
different communication modes)
(a) M→ A,η4a :
TID,PurchAmt,HOD,PIdata
(b) M→ A,η4b : TID,PurchAmt,HOD
5. A→M,η5 : TID,HOD,AuthCode
6. M→C,η6 : TID,HOD,AuthCode
Table 9 shows the communication modes we
specify to instantiate the previous protocol tem-
plate to our revised variants of the unsigned and
signed versions of SET.
6.2. Main Results of SET Security Verification
We verified the AnBx specifications of the
SET purchase protocol and carried out a corre-
sponding analysis of the original specifications,
as reported in [31]. In general, the security guar-
antees of our version of the protocols outper-
form those of the original specification [31], as
reported in Table 10. It is worth noting, in par-
ticular, that two known flaws affecting the SET
original specification do not compromise our re-
vised versions.
The first flaw [31] involves the fifth step of the
protocol, where it is not possible to univocally
link the identity of the Acquirer and the Mer-
chant with the on-going transaction and the au-
thorization code. Namely, the original instruc-
tion should be amended to include the identity
of the merchant M, otherwise the goal “C au-
thenticates M on AuthCode” cannot be satisfied.
In our revised version the exchange at step 5 is
automatically compiled into a message includ-
ing the identity of both the Merchant and the
Customer, so the problem is solved.
The same implementation also prevents the
second flaw, presented in [43]. In that paper
the specification of the protocol is more detailed
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unsigned SET signed SET
Goal O R O R
pan secret between C,A + + + +
A weakly authenticates C on pan - - + +
OrderDesc secret between C,M + + + +
PurchAmt secret between C,M,A - - + +
AuthCode secret between C,M,A - - - +
M authenticates A on AuthCode + + + +
C authenticates A on AuthCode - + - +
C authenticates M on AuthCode +* + +* +
A authenticates C on contract - - w w
M authenticates C on contract - - + +
A authenticates M on contract - + - +
C authenticates M on contract + + + +
C authenticates A on contract,AuthCode - + - +
M authenticates A on contract,AuthCode + + + +
* goal satisfied only fixing step 5 as in [31]
w = only weak authentication
for revised SET : contract = PriceAmt,TID,[PIData:A], [OIData:M]
for original SET : contract = PriceAmt,TID,hash(PIData),hash(OIData)
Table 10: Security goals satisfied by Original and Revised SET purchase protocol
than in [31], as it introduces an additional field
AuthRRTags, which includes the identity of the
Merchant. We tested with OFMC the version
of SET presented in [43] and verified the pres-
ence of the flaw, namely an attack against the
purchase phase, which exploits a lack of verifi-
cation in the payment authorization process. It
may allow a dishonest Customer to cheat on an
honest Merchant when collaborating with an-
other dishonest Merchant. The attack is based
on the fact that neither LIDM nor XID can be
considered unique, so they cannot be used to
identify a specific Merchant. Therefore the cus-
tomer can start a parallel purchase with an ac-
complice, playing the role of another merchant,
and make the Acquirer authorize the payment
in favor of the accomplice. Here, again the goal
“C authenticates M on AuthCode” fails.
During our analysis we also verified that both
the original specifications [31, 43] fail to ver-
ify the goals “C authenticates A on AuthCode”
and “C authenticates M on contract,AuthCode”.
To overcome this problem the protocol must be
fixed in the sixth (and final) step, as already
outlined in [40]. This issue also leads us to more
interesting considerations on how to prove the
authorization of the transaction.
Proving authorization of the transaction. The
previous problem arises from the fact that the
Customer does not have an evidence of the ori-
gin of AuthCode by the Acquirer and she rather
relies only on information provided by the Mer-
chant. For example, giving to the Customer
a proof that the Acquirer authorized the pay-
ment requires substantial modification of the
sixth step of the protocol. In fact, instead of let-
ting the Merchant sign a message for the Cus-
tomer, we exploit the AnBx forward mode to
bring to the Customer the authorization of the
payment signed directly by the Acquirer. It is
worth noticing that, employing a fresh forward
mode in the sixth step, we can achieve the de-
sired strong authenticity goal on the pair, even
though the transaction identifier is not unique.
We can then confirm the results outlined in
[40], showing that, while iKP meets all the non-
repudiation goals, the original specification of
SET does not. It is important to notice that, to
achieve non-repudiation, each participant must
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have sufficient proofs to convince an external
verifier that the transaction was actually car-
ried out as she claims. A way to obtain this is
to assume that the authentication is obtained
by means of digital signatures computed with
keys which are valid within a Public Key Infras-
tructure and are issued by a trusted third party
(Certification Authority). Although this limits
the way authentic channels in AnBx could be
implemented, in practice it does not represent
a significant restriction, since in the considered
protocols digital signature is the standard way
meant to achieve authentication.
7. Conclusions
We presented AnBx , the currently most ex-
pressive Alice & Bob-style language. The distin-
guishing key-features of the language is a pow-
erful concept of channels that includes forward-
ing. We analysed the formal details related to
the definition of the language, and we proved a
connection between the ideal behaviour of our
channels and a simple cryptographic implemen-
tation. We showed the amenability of the lan-
guage on two case studies from the e-payment
area, namely iKP and SET, and we argue that
the abstraction from low-level security mecha-
nisms turns out to be helpful for protocols de-
signers. Our compiler from AnBx to IF is avail-
able online5 along with the related documenta-
tion and the source code of both our case stud-
ies.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 2
The idea behind the proof is to abuse a pop-
ular verification technique as a proof argument,
namely the symbolic constraint-based approach
that we call “the lazy intruder” [44, 45, 46, 37].
The intuition behind the lazy intruder is as fol-
lows. Every trace can be seen as an instance
of a symbolic trace, i.e., a sequence of transition
rule applications where we delay the unification
of left-hand side ik(m) facts and leave variables
in there uninstantiated. Instead, we keep a con-
straint M ` m, where M is the set of messages
the intruder knows at that state. Such a con-
straint expresses that the intruder must be able
to generate the message m from knowledge M.
Thus, these constraints before reduction contain
only messages m, or instances thereof, for which
ik(m) occurs in the IF specification of the pro-
tocol P. It can be shown that, if there is an
attack trace, then there is a corresponding sym-
bolic trace with satisfiable intruder constraints,
hence in the proof we can focus without loss of
generality on such symbolic traces.
The lazy intruder technique is based on a cal-
culus of constraint reduction rules for checking
their satisfiability (and, if satisfiable, determine
a solution). There are three constraint reduc-
tion rules: Generate (to compose new mes-
sages from public function symbols), Analyze
(to obtain all subterms of known messages by
decryption and projection) and Unify, which
states that a possible solution to the constraint
M ` s exists if there is a t ∈M, both s and t are
not variables, s and t have the most general uni-
fier σ , and all other constraints are satisfiable
under σ . The formal constraint reduction rules
are reported below, where we let φ range over
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M ` s constraints or conjunctions thereof. For
the Analyze rule we give only the example of
asymmetric decryption, other rules are similar.
Unify (σ ∈mgu(s, t) and s, t /∈ V )
φσ
φ ∧ ({s}∪M ` t)
Generate ( f public)
φ ∧ (M ` t1)∧ . . .∧ (M ` tn)
φ ∧ (M ` f (t1, . . . , tn))
Analyze ({m}k ∈M)
φ ∧ (M ` t)∧M ` inv(k)
φ ∧M ` t
We can finally prove the theorem.
Restatement of Theorem 2 1. If there is an
attack against a typeable protocol, then there is
a well-typed one, i.e., where every variable X is
instantiated with a term t such that Γ(X) = Γ(t).
Proof 4. Assume an arbitrary attack trace and
consider its corresponding symbolic trace: we
show that all instantiations of variables of its
(satisfiable) intruder constraints are well-typed,
hence the existence of an attack implies the exis-
tence of a well-typed one. Technically, we actu-
ally need to prove a stronger result by induction
over the entire constraint reduction: we prove
that every message occurring in the constraints,
and any arbitrary subterm of it, is either a vari-
able or an instance of a message in SMP(P), and
that all variables are only instantiated in a well-
typed way.
Let us first consider a protocol P such that no
element of MP(P) is a variable, i.e., P does not
involve any step where a “bare value” is trans-
mitted, but all messages are composed terms
or constants. In this case, MP(P) ⊆ SMP(P),
i.e., the union of the initial intruder knowledge
and the messages exchanged in P is included in
SMP(P). The Generate and Analyze cases
are straightforward to handle, since, in partic-
ular, such rules do not instantiate any vari-
able. In the Unify case, both s and t must
be instances of elements of SMP by induction,
since they are not variables. Given that s and
t have a unifier, the typeability assumption im-
plies Γ(s) = Γ(t), hence also all corresponding
subterms of s and t must have the same types
by Definition 2, and the substitution σ is hence
well-typed.
Finally, we extend the proof to any protocol
P we excluded above, i.e., such that there exists
a variable in MP(P). Let P′ be a modification
of P where every “bare variable” X is replaced
by the composed term (t,X) for some fresh tag
t that is initially known to the intruder. As-
sume now that P has an attack, then also P′ has
an attack, since the previous wrapping does not
enforce any protection. By construction P′ sat-
isfies the hypotheses of the previous point, hence
for any attack on P′ there is a well-typed attack
on P′, but it is immediate that such well-typed
attack works also on P when removing the tag t.
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